Threat screen
Inspect the incoming query for injection attempts, unsafe instructions, or prompt patterns that should not survive into retrieval.
This system was designed for legal and compliance-style knowledge workflows where the answer is only useful if the evidence is real, traceable, and strong enough to support the response.
The architecture is intentionally defensive. Each stage is there to reduce unsupported answers and make the final output auditable.
Inspect the incoming query for injection attempts, unsafe instructions, or prompt patterns that should not survive into retrieval.
Combine lexical and vector retrieval, then apply reranking to improve both recall and passage quality before answer generation.
Require enough support before the system proceeds. If the evidence is thin, the answer path stops instead of bluffing.
Challenge the draft answer against the retrieved support so the model has to survive a second evidence check.
Ensure cited passages exist, line up with the answer, and do not claim evidence the source does not actually contain.
Grade support quality and log traces so the team can evaluate behavior from telemetry rather than anecdotes.
The design targets a class of use cases where "close enough" is not acceptable. The answer has to either point to real support or decline to answer.
This design treats unsupported output as a failure condition, not as an acceptable side effect of model behavior.
Logging, traces, and evidence grading create a path to regression testing and operating discipline.
The pattern fits legal, compliance, policy, and other knowledge workflows where weak sourcing creates risk quickly.
This brief is meant to show architecture judgment and product posture. The right next step is usually a direct conversation about the operating constraints in your own system.